

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM :
Deputy Director of Security (PSI)

SUBJECT : Security Review Task Force Report

1. Senior members of my staff met on 20 April 1977 to review the recommendations in the Security Review Task Force Report and to decide which ones could be implemented immediately by PSI with no additional resources. Outlined below are the specific recommendations which were considered and the action to be implemented.

2. Key Recommendations

#3. Immediate action should be taken to initiate a program of selective polygraphs in private industry, where key contractor personnel have access to sensitive codeword documents. There should be a follow-on program of repolygraphs at a later date.

Action: The Office of General Counsel has been tasked with defining a legal basis for polygraphs in the private sector. Polygraph Branch can begin examinations now on a selected number of cases (it is understood that about 25 have been identified with an examiner on extended TDY. Any heavy requirements involving additional examiners will impact on Staff RIP polygraphs. It is believed that we should respond to DDS&T Security managers as customers rather than to the contractor security officer.

#4. Investigative coverage in industrial cases should be expanded and emphasized, particularly in terms of peer connections, because of the sensitive access that is often involved.

OS 7 2441

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1 3. The [] Case - Recommendations

#1. The Director of Security continue the existing repolygraph program as a high priority requirement, maintaining as an absolute minimum the established goal of 1,500 cases a year.

25X1 Action: Within three months, when two additional examiners are fully trained, the Polygraph Branch will be conducting RIP polygraphs at the rate of 1,500 per year.

[]
to 900 per year, using present resources. The following items were discussed as possible ways to divert resources to RIPS:

a. Discontinue or reduce coverage on Summer Only Employees.

25X1 c. Review and down grade requirements for full 15-year BI on certain [] cases on personnel with limited access to Headquarters building, e.g. cafeteria workers.

d. Extend processing time of applicant cases from 45 to 60 days.

e. Consider upgrading the prescreening and selection of applicants by Office of Personnel.

25X1 #2. The Director of Security continue to emphasize the "quality" aspects of the repolygraph program and not permit any inappropriate restrictions on the examiners in covering security issues.

Action: Agreed. No action necessary at this time.

#3. The Director of Security hold firm with an absolute minimum of 1,500 Reinvestigation cases a year, and that there be continued close monitoring of this program, with a view toward conforming with the five-year requirement.

Action: We will attempt to meet the 1,500 cases per year. Conforming to the five-year requirement will require

SECRET

more than 2,000 cases per year, which cannot be accomplished without additional resources.



25X1

#9. The Director of Security, in coordination with the Offices of Personnel and the Inspector General, determine from the General Counsel, with some reasonable specificity, the authorities or limitations of the Director relative to terminating employees who fit the mold of [redacted] where there is a multiplicity of factors in the suitability/security area.

25X1

25X1

Action: PSI will pursue this item, effective immediately.

#10. The Overseas Candidate Review Panel be revalidated and be given greater emphasis as an Agency personnel screening procedure for overseas assignment.

Action: PSI will pursue this item, effective immediately.

4. The [redacted] Case - Personnel Security Recommendations

#1. The Director of Security take steps to initiate a program of selective polygraphs in private industry, where "key" contractor personnel have access to particularly sensitive codeword documents.

Action: Taking action as discussed under Key Recommendation #3.

#3. The Office of Security institute a program covering the following:

a. Insure that our investigative force is sufficiently briefed on the sensitivity of the programs for which contractor personnel are being cleared.



25X1

SECRET

SECRET

(#3.a., and #3.b., were covered under Key Recommendations)

#6. The Director of Security, in coordination with the Office of Medical Services and the Directorate of Science and Technology, take whatever steps are necessary to establish an Industrial Review Panel, modeled after the Agency's Applicant Review Panel.

Action: Chief, Clearance Division will implement this recommendation when Office of Medical Services participation is assured.

#7. The application of personnel security standards in the appraisal of industrial cases be upgraded to the level of the application currently in effect in the appraisal of Agency staff employee cases.

Action: Already initiated, with polygraph to be added as discussed under Key Recommendations.

#12. The Office of Security conduct a comprehensive assessment of the counterintelligence problem in the industrial arena, and determine what efforts should be made to tighten security in the face of the Soviet threat.

Action: Chief, Security Analysis Group will address this item.

#13. The Director of Security establish a repolygraph program in the Agency Sensitive Compartmented Information contractor community.

Action: Polygraph Branch will assume action for this action, as previously noted under Key Recommendations.

The [] - Communications Security Recommendations

25X1

#4. The Director of Security will establish and implement a priority polygraph program, as a supplement to the background investigation, focusing on all industrial communications personnel.

Action: To be assumed by Polygraph Branch, as discussed under Key Recommendations.

5. The remaining recommendations were deemed not directly applicable to PSI at this time.

Distribution:

Orig - Adse.
1 - C/CD
1 - C/SSD
1 - C/SAG
1 - Chrono
1 - Registry
1 - Subject File

SECRET

25X1

25X1